forked from akai/readest
6e7c9d1395b5ea4a2c87fe4ee4afae5b39d16681
2 Commits
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6e7c9d1395 |
feat(sync): bundled settings replica kind for cross-device prefs and credentials (#4094)
* feat(sync): add bundled `settings` replica kind for cross-device prefs and credentials Adds a single-row `settings` replica that syncs a whitelist of `SystemSettings` fields across devices via per-field LWW (one entry per dot-namespaced path). Plaintext for theme / highlight colour / TTS configuration; encrypted (AES-GCM under the user's sync passphrase) for kosync / Readwise / Hardcover credentials. Highlights: - Push-side diff against an in-memory snapshot for plaintext paths and a localStorage SHA-256 hash for encrypted paths, so a refresh doesn't re-publish or re-prompt for the passphrase. - Pull-side cipher-fingerprint dedupe + per-row passphrase gate; decryption failures surface as toasts (wrong passphrase / orphan cipher) instead of silent drops. - Auto-recovery for orphaned ciphers: when a row references a saltId no longer in `replica_keys`, clear the local hash and re-encrypt under the current salt on the next save. - Single in-flight `/sync/replica-keys` fetch with a value cache to coalesce the boot-time burst of concurrent unlock callers. * fix(sync): guard settings dot-path helpers against prototype-polluting keys Reject `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` segments in the settings adapter's `readPath` / `writePath`. Every caller currently passes a constant from `SETTINGS_WHITELIST`, so the guard is purely defensive — but it silences the CodeQL prototype-pollution warning on PR #4094 and keeps the helpers safe if a future call site ever forwards an untrusted path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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712d564e9d |
feat(sync): encrypted OPDS credentials + Tauri keychain (PR 4c + 4d) (#4090)
* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path) Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware. TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain. - ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`. Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip. - replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local plaintext preserved by the store merge). - replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware. - OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and now pack/unpack them as plaintext. - passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock, throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel. - PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers itself as the gate prompter. - CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts. - Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE /api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper. - SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock / Lock / Forgot. - CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials are present; user cancel saves locally without sync. Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri) Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design. Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms: - Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native, Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/ Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each platform compiles only the backend it needs. - iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword, SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete). - Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences (AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key, AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption). TS layer: - TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud (surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on any error so the gate prompts). - createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously; upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the swap is transparent. - CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale- entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store. - Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test fixes + UX polish: Pull-side decrypt: - decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of dropping the field. - replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization doesn't apply). - Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for each encrypted field, compare against the local record's lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different (rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher. Web persistence: - SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary. UI: - Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary + btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered + btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering. - globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus indicator). - AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`, `btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with e-paper support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |