* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path)
Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession
shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware.
TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per
launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain.
- ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`.
Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip.
- replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named
fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext
leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local
plaintext preserved by the store merge).
- replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware.
- OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and
now pack/unpack them as plaintext.
- passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent
calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock,
throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel.
- PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers
itself as the gate prompter.
- CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts.
- Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE
/api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper.
- SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock /
Lock / Forgot.
- CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials
are present; user cancel saves locally without sync.
Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri)
Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real
OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase
every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design.
Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms:
- Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native,
Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/
Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each
platform compiles only the backend it needs.
- iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword,
SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete).
- Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences
(AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key,
AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption).
TS layer:
- TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud
(surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on
any error so the gate prompts).
- createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously;
upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to
TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession
resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the
swap is transparent.
- CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale-
entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt
server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store.
- Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish
PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped
ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web
re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test
fixes + UX polish:
Pull-side decrypt:
- decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator
wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a
locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of
dropping the field.
- replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only
kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds
reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization
doesn't apply).
- Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for
each encrypted field, compare against the local record's
lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different
(rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to
re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher.
Web persistence:
- SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh
within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces
EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids
localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary.
UI:
- Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled
input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary +
btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered +
btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering.
- globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text
inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus
indicator).
- AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`,
`btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with
e-paper support.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Huang Xin