712d564e9d
* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path) Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware. TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain. - ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`. Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip. - replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local plaintext preserved by the store merge). - replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware. - OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and now pack/unpack them as plaintext. - passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock, throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel. - PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers itself as the gate prompter. - CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts. - Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE /api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper. - SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock / Lock / Forgot. - CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials are present; user cancel saves locally without sync. Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri) Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design. Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms: - Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native, Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/ Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each platform compiles only the backend it needs. - iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword, SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete). - Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences (AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key, AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption). TS layer: - TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud (surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on any error so the gate prompts). - createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously; upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the swap is transparent. - CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale- entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store. - Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test fixes + UX polish: Pull-side decrypt: - decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of dropping the field. - replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization doesn't apply). - Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for each encrypted field, compare against the local record's lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different (rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher. Web persistence: - SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary. UI: - Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary + btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered + btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering. - globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus indicator). - AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`, `btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with e-paper support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
99 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
99 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Coordinates the passphrase prompt UI with the CryptoSession.
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*
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* - The UI registers a prompter at app boot via `setPassphrasePrompter`.
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* - Callers about to sync an encrypted field call `ensurePassphraseUnlocked`.
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* - If the session is already unlocked, returns immediately.
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* - If the user has an existing salt on the server, the prompter is
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* called with `{ kind: 'unlock' }` and the entered passphrase is
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* used to derive the existing key.
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* - If the server has no salt yet (first encrypted op for the
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* account), the prompter is called with `{ kind: 'setup' }` and
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* the entered passphrase mints a fresh salt + key.
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* - When the user cancels the modal, ensurePassphraseUnlocked rejects
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* with `NO_PASSPHRASE`. Callers handle by aborting the sync action
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* (e.g., refusing to save credentials, falling back to plaintext-only).
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*
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* The gate is platform-agnostic — same path on web (ephemeral session)
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* and native (also ephemeral until PR 4d wires the keychain). Once 4d
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* lands, the only change is that `cryptoSession.unlock` reads the
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* passphrase from the keychain on subsequent launches without
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* re-prompting.
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*/
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import { SyncError } from '@/libs/errors';
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import { cryptoSession as defaultCryptoSession } from '@/libs/crypto/session';
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import { replicaSyncClient } from '@/libs/replicaSyncClient';
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import type { CryptoSession } from '@/libs/crypto/session';
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import type { ReplicaSyncClient } from '@/libs/replicaSyncClient';
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export type PassphrasePromptKind = 'unlock' | 'setup';
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export interface PassphrasePromptRequest {
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kind: PassphrasePromptKind;
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}
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export type PassphrasePrompter = (req: PassphrasePromptRequest) => Promise<string | null>;
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let prompter: PassphrasePrompter | null = null;
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let inflight: Promise<void> | null = null;
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export const setPassphrasePrompter = (p: PassphrasePrompter | null): void => {
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prompter = p;
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};
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interface EnsureUnlockedDeps {
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session?: CryptoSession;
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client?: Pick<ReplicaSyncClient, 'listReplicaKeys'>;
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}
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/**
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* Resolves once the CryptoSession is unlocked. If unlocked already,
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* resolves immediately. If a prompt is already in flight, awaits the
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* existing one (so concurrent calls don't open multiple modals).
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*
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* Throws `NO_PASSPHRASE` when the user cancels or no prompter has
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* been registered. Throws other SyncError codes for crypto failures
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* (CRYPTO_UNAVAILABLE, AUTH, SERVER, ...).
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*/
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export const ensurePassphraseUnlocked = async (deps: EnsureUnlockedDeps = {}): Promise<void> => {
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const session = deps.session ?? defaultCryptoSession;
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const client = deps.client ?? replicaSyncClient;
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if (session.isUnlocked()) return;
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if (inflight) return inflight;
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inflight = (async () => {
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try {
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if (!prompter) {
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throw new SyncError('NO_PASSPHRASE', 'No passphrase prompter registered');
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}
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// Decide setup vs unlock by checking whether the server has any
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// salt rows for this user. The gate doesn't try to silently
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// unlock — it always prompts; the kind argument lets the modal
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// render the right copy.
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const rows = await client.listReplicaKeys();
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const kind: PassphrasePromptKind = rows.length === 0 ? 'setup' : 'unlock';
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const passphrase = await prompter({ kind });
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if (passphrase === null || passphrase === '') {
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throw new SyncError('NO_PASSPHRASE', 'User cancelled the passphrase prompt');
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}
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if (kind === 'setup') {
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await session.setup(passphrase);
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} else {
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await session.unlock(passphrase);
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}
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} finally {
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inflight = null;
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}
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})();
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return inflight;
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};
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/** Test seam — clear in-flight + prompter between specs. */
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export const __resetPassphraseGateForTests = (): void => {
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prompter = null;
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inflight = null;
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};
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