Files
readest/apps/readest-app/src/services/sync/passphraseGate.ts
T
Huang Xin 712d564e9d feat(sync): encrypted OPDS credentials + Tauri keychain (PR 4c + 4d) (#4090)
* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path)

Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession
shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware.
TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per
launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain.

- ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`.
  Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip.
- replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named
  fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext
  leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local
  plaintext preserved by the store merge).
- replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware.
- OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and
  now pack/unpack them as plaintext.
- passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent
  calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock,
  throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel.
- PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers
  itself as the gate prompter.
- CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts.
- Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE
  /api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper.
- SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock /
  Lock / Forgot.
- CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials
  are present; user cancel saves locally without sync.

Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri)

Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real
OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase
every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design.

Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms:

- Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native,
  Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/
  Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each
  platform compiles only the backend it needs.
- iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword,
  SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete).
- Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences
  (AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key,
  AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption).

TS layer:

- TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud
  (surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on
  any error so the gate prompts).
- createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously;
  upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to
  TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession
  resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the
  swap is transparent.
- CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale-
  entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt
  server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store.
- Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish

PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped
ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web
re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test
fixes + UX polish:

Pull-side decrypt:
- decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator
  wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a
  locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of
  dropping the field.
- replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only
  kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds
  reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization
  doesn't apply).
- Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for
  each encrypted field, compare against the local record's
  lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different
  (rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to
  re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher.

Web persistence:
- SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh
  within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces
  EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids
  localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary.

UI:
- Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled
  input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary +
  btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered +
  btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering.
- globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text
  inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus
  indicator).
- AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`,
  `btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with
  e-paper support.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 13:22:49 +02:00

99 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Coordinates the passphrase prompt UI with the CryptoSession.
*
* - The UI registers a prompter at app boot via `setPassphrasePrompter`.
* - Callers about to sync an encrypted field call `ensurePassphraseUnlocked`.
* - If the session is already unlocked, returns immediately.
* - If the user has an existing salt on the server, the prompter is
* called with `{ kind: 'unlock' }` and the entered passphrase is
* used to derive the existing key.
* - If the server has no salt yet (first encrypted op for the
* account), the prompter is called with `{ kind: 'setup' }` and
* the entered passphrase mints a fresh salt + key.
* - When the user cancels the modal, ensurePassphraseUnlocked rejects
* with `NO_PASSPHRASE`. Callers handle by aborting the sync action
* (e.g., refusing to save credentials, falling back to plaintext-only).
*
* The gate is platform-agnostic — same path on web (ephemeral session)
* and native (also ephemeral until PR 4d wires the keychain). Once 4d
* lands, the only change is that `cryptoSession.unlock` reads the
* passphrase from the keychain on subsequent launches without
* re-prompting.
*/
import { SyncError } from '@/libs/errors';
import { cryptoSession as defaultCryptoSession } from '@/libs/crypto/session';
import { replicaSyncClient } from '@/libs/replicaSyncClient';
import type { CryptoSession } from '@/libs/crypto/session';
import type { ReplicaSyncClient } from '@/libs/replicaSyncClient';
export type PassphrasePromptKind = 'unlock' | 'setup';
export interface PassphrasePromptRequest {
kind: PassphrasePromptKind;
}
export type PassphrasePrompter = (req: PassphrasePromptRequest) => Promise<string | null>;
let prompter: PassphrasePrompter | null = null;
let inflight: Promise<void> | null = null;
export const setPassphrasePrompter = (p: PassphrasePrompter | null): void => {
prompter = p;
};
interface EnsureUnlockedDeps {
session?: CryptoSession;
client?: Pick<ReplicaSyncClient, 'listReplicaKeys'>;
}
/**
* Resolves once the CryptoSession is unlocked. If unlocked already,
* resolves immediately. If a prompt is already in flight, awaits the
* existing one (so concurrent calls don't open multiple modals).
*
* Throws `NO_PASSPHRASE` when the user cancels or no prompter has
* been registered. Throws other SyncError codes for crypto failures
* (CRYPTO_UNAVAILABLE, AUTH, SERVER, ...).
*/
export const ensurePassphraseUnlocked = async (deps: EnsureUnlockedDeps = {}): Promise<void> => {
const session = deps.session ?? defaultCryptoSession;
const client = deps.client ?? replicaSyncClient;
if (session.isUnlocked()) return;
if (inflight) return inflight;
inflight = (async () => {
try {
if (!prompter) {
throw new SyncError('NO_PASSPHRASE', 'No passphrase prompter registered');
}
// Decide setup vs unlock by checking whether the server has any
// salt rows for this user. The gate doesn't try to silently
// unlock — it always prompts; the kind argument lets the modal
// render the right copy.
const rows = await client.listReplicaKeys();
const kind: PassphrasePromptKind = rows.length === 0 ? 'setup' : 'unlock';
const passphrase = await prompter({ kind });
if (passphrase === null || passphrase === '') {
throw new SyncError('NO_PASSPHRASE', 'User cancelled the passphrase prompt');
}
if (kind === 'setup') {
await session.setup(passphrase);
} else {
await session.unlock(passphrase);
}
} finally {
inflight = null;
}
})();
return inflight;
};
/** Test seam — clear in-flight + prompter between specs. */
export const __resetPassphraseGateForTests = (): void => {
prompter = null;
inflight = null;
};