Files
readest/apps/readest-app/src/services/sync/replicaRegistry.ts
T
Huang Xin 712d564e9d feat(sync): encrypted OPDS credentials + Tauri keychain (PR 4c + 4d) (#4090)
* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path)

Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession
shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware.
TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per
launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain.

- ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`.
  Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip.
- replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named
  fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext
  leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local
  plaintext preserved by the store merge).
- replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware.
- OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and
  now pack/unpack them as plaintext.
- passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent
  calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock,
  throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel.
- PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers
  itself as the gate prompter.
- CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts.
- Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE
  /api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper.
- SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock /
  Lock / Forgot.
- CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials
  are present; user cancel saves locally without sync.

Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri)

Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real
OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase
every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design.

Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms:

- Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native,
  Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/
  Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each
  platform compiles only the backend it needs.
- iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword,
  SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete).
- Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences
  (AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key,
  AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption).

TS layer:

- TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud
  (surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on
  any error so the gate prompts).
- createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously;
  upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to
  TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession
  resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the
  swap is transparent.
- CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale-
  entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt
  server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store.
- Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish

PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped
ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web
re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test
fixes + UX polish:

Pull-side decrypt:
- decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator
  wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a
  locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of
  dropping the field.
- replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only
  kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds
  reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization
  doesn't apply).
- Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for
  each encrypted field, compare against the local record's
  lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different
  (rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to
  re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher.

Web persistence:
- SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh
  within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces
  EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids
  localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary.

UI:
- Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled
  input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary +
  btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered +
  btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering.
- globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text
  inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus
  indicator).
- AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`,
  `btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with
  e-paper support.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 13:22:49 +02:00

67 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

import type { ReplicaRow } from '@/types/replica';
import type { BaseDir, FileSystem } from '@/types/system';
export interface BinaryCapability<T> {
localBaseDir: BaseDir;
enumerateFiles(replica: T): { logical: string; lfp: string; byteSize: number }[];
}
export interface LifecycleHooks<T> {
postDownload?(replica: T, fs: FileSystem): Promise<void>;
validateOnLoad?(replica: T, fs: FileSystem): Promise<{ unavailable?: boolean }>;
}
export interface ReplicaAdapter<T = unknown> {
kind: string;
schemaVersion: number;
pack(replica: T): Record<string, unknown>;
unpack(fields: Record<string, unknown>): T;
computeId(input: T): Promise<string>;
/**
* Build a local placeholder record from a pulled replica row. Used by
* the generic pull orchestrator to dispatch row → record translation
* without knowing the kind. Returns null when the row's fields are
* malformed (missing required fields). The bundleDir is the freshly-
* created (or reused) on-disk directory the binaries will land in.
*/
unpackRow(row: ReplicaRow, bundleDir: string): T | null;
/**
* Display label for the orchestrator's transfer-queue title. Defaults
* to the record's `name` field when unset; adapters override only if
* they want a different surface label.
*/
getDisplayName?(record: T): string;
binary?: BinaryCapability<T>;
lifecycle?: LifecycleHooks<T>;
/**
* Field names whose values are encrypted before push and decrypted
* after pull. The publish/pull middleware handles the crypto round
* trip via the active CryptoSession; pack/unpack always see plain
* values. Absent or empty means the kind has no encrypted fields.
*
* Encryption is best-effort: if the session isn't unlocked, encrypted
* fields are dropped from the push (the row syncs without them) and
* decrypt failure on pull is logged + the field is omitted from the
* unpacked record so local plaintext copies are preserved.
*/
encryptedFields?: readonly string[];
}
const registry = new Map<string, ReplicaAdapter<unknown>>();
export const registerReplicaAdapter = <T>(adapter: ReplicaAdapter<T>): void => {
if (registry.has(adapter.kind)) {
throw new Error(`Replica adapter for kind="${adapter.kind}" is already registered`);
}
registry.set(adapter.kind, adapter as ReplicaAdapter<unknown>);
};
export const getReplicaAdapter = <T = unknown>(kind: string): ReplicaAdapter<T> | undefined =>
registry.get(kind) as ReplicaAdapter<T> | undefined;
export const listReplicaAdapters = (): ReplicaAdapter<unknown>[] => Array.from(registry.values());
export const clearReplicaAdapters = (): void => {
registry.clear();
};