712d564e9d
* feat(sync): encrypt opds_catalog credentials end-to-end (TS path) Wires encrypted-credential sync for opds_catalog via the CryptoSession shipped in PR 4a (#4084) plus a new publish/pull crypto middleware. TS-only — native still uses ephemeral storage (re-enter passphrase per launch); PR 4d wires the OS keychain. - ReplicaAdapter gains optional `encryptedFields: readonly string[]`. Adapters stay sync; the middleware handles the crypto round trip. - replicaCryptoMiddleware.ts: encryptPackedFields drops the named fields from the push when the session is locked (no plaintext leak); decryptRowFields drops them on pull failure (local plaintext preserved by the store merge). - replicaPublish / replicaPullAndApply invoke the middleware. - OPDS adapter declares encryptedFields = [username, password] and now pack/unpack them as plaintext. - passphraseGate.ts: ensurePassphraseUnlocked coalesces concurrent calls, prompts via the registered prompter with kind=setup|unlock, throws NO_PASSPHRASE on cancel. - PassphrasePromptModal mounted at the Providers root; registers itself as the gate prompter. - CryptoSession.forget() wipes server-side envelopes + salts. - Migration 010 + replica_keys_forget RPC; DELETE /api/sync/replica-keys + client wrapper. - SyncPassphraseSection on the user page: status / Set / Unlock / Lock / Forgot. - CatalogManager pre-save: ensurePassphraseUnlocked when credentials are present; user cancel saves locally without sync. Plan updated: PR 4 split documented as 4a/4b/4c/4d. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sync): persist sync passphrase via OS keychain (Tauri) Replaces the EphemeralPassphraseStore stub on native with real OS-keychain storage so users don't re-enter their sync passphrase every launch. Web stays on the in-memory ephemeral store by design. Native bridge plugin gains 4 commands wired across all platforms: - Rust desktop (`keyring` crate): macOS Keychain on apple-native, Windows Credential Manager on windows-native, Linux libsecret/ Secret Service on sync-secret-service. Per-target features so each platform compiles only the backend it needs. - iOS Swift: Security framework Keychain (kSecClassGenericPassword, SecItemAdd / Copy / Delete). - Android Kotlin: androidx.security EncryptedSharedPreferences (AndroidKeystore-derived AES-GCM master key, AES256_SIV / AES256_GCM key/value encryption). TS layer: - TauriPassphraseStore wraps the bridge calls. set is fail-loud (surfaces keychain rejection); get is fail-soft (returns null on any error so the gate prompts). - createPassphraseStore returns ephemeral synchronously; upgradeToKeychainIfAvailable swaps the singleton to TauriPassphraseStore on Tauri after probing the bridge. CryptoSession resolves the store via createPassphraseStore() each touch so the swap is transparent. - CryptoSession.tryRestoreFromStore: silent unlock at boot. Stale- entry recovery clears the store when the account has no salt server-side. unlock/setup persist; forget also clears the store. - Providers boot effect: upgrade keychain → silent restore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sync): make encrypted-credential pull actually decrypt + UX polish PR 4c shipped the encrypt path but the pull side silently dropped ciphers when locked, the modal was busy with double-rings, and web re-prompted on every page refresh. This rolls up the post-test fixes + UX polish: Pull-side decrypt: - decryptRowFields takes an `onLocked` callback the orchestrator wires to the passphrase gate; encountering a cipher field with a locked session now triggers the lazy-prompt path instead of dropping the field. - replicaPullAndApply re-applies the unpacked row for metadata-only kinds even when a local copy exists, so the now-decrypted creds reach the store (the binary-kind skip-if-local optimization doesn't apply). - Cipher fingerprint comparison: capture the row's `cipher.c` for each encrypted field, compare against the local record's lastSeenCipher. Same → skip prompt + decrypt entirely. Different (rotation / value change on another device) → prompt to re-decrypt. Fingerprint persists via OPDSCatalog.lastSeenCipher. Web persistence: - SessionStoragePassphraseStore: passphrase survives page refresh within the same tab, dies on tab close. Replaces EphemeralPassphraseStore as the default on web. Avoids localStorage / IndexedDB to keep the tab-scoped trust boundary. UI: - Renamed PassphrasePromptModal → PassphrasePrompt; modernized: filled input style with single subtle focus border, btn-primary + btn-ghost replaced with leaner custom buttons. eink-bordered + btn-primary classes give the dialog correct e-paper rendering. - globals.css: suppress redundant outline/box-shadow on focused text inputs / textareas (the element's own border is the focus indicator). - AGENTS.md: documents the e-ink convention (`eink-bordered`, `btn-primary` for inverted CTAs, etc.) so future widgets ship with e-paper support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
67 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
import type { ReplicaRow } from '@/types/replica';
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import type { BaseDir, FileSystem } from '@/types/system';
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export interface BinaryCapability<T> {
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localBaseDir: BaseDir;
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enumerateFiles(replica: T): { logical: string; lfp: string; byteSize: number }[];
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}
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export interface LifecycleHooks<T> {
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postDownload?(replica: T, fs: FileSystem): Promise<void>;
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validateOnLoad?(replica: T, fs: FileSystem): Promise<{ unavailable?: boolean }>;
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}
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export interface ReplicaAdapter<T = unknown> {
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kind: string;
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schemaVersion: number;
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pack(replica: T): Record<string, unknown>;
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unpack(fields: Record<string, unknown>): T;
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computeId(input: T): Promise<string>;
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/**
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* Build a local placeholder record from a pulled replica row. Used by
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* the generic pull orchestrator to dispatch row → record translation
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* without knowing the kind. Returns null when the row's fields are
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* malformed (missing required fields). The bundleDir is the freshly-
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* created (or reused) on-disk directory the binaries will land in.
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*/
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unpackRow(row: ReplicaRow, bundleDir: string): T | null;
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/**
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* Display label for the orchestrator's transfer-queue title. Defaults
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* to the record's `name` field when unset; adapters override only if
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* they want a different surface label.
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*/
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getDisplayName?(record: T): string;
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binary?: BinaryCapability<T>;
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lifecycle?: LifecycleHooks<T>;
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/**
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* Field names whose values are encrypted before push and decrypted
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* after pull. The publish/pull middleware handles the crypto round
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* trip via the active CryptoSession; pack/unpack always see plain
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* values. Absent or empty means the kind has no encrypted fields.
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*
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* Encryption is best-effort: if the session isn't unlocked, encrypted
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* fields are dropped from the push (the row syncs without them) and
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* decrypt failure on pull is logged + the field is omitted from the
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* unpacked record so local plaintext copies are preserved.
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*/
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encryptedFields?: readonly string[];
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}
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const registry = new Map<string, ReplicaAdapter<unknown>>();
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export const registerReplicaAdapter = <T>(adapter: ReplicaAdapter<T>): void => {
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if (registry.has(adapter.kind)) {
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throw new Error(`Replica adapter for kind="${adapter.kind}" is already registered`);
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}
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registry.set(adapter.kind, adapter as ReplicaAdapter<unknown>);
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};
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export const getReplicaAdapter = <T = unknown>(kind: string): ReplicaAdapter<T> | undefined =>
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registry.get(kind) as ReplicaAdapter<T> | undefined;
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export const listReplicaAdapters = (): ReplicaAdapter<unknown>[] => Array.from(registry.values());
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export const clearReplicaAdapters = (): void => {
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registry.clear();
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};
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